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Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets
(or Hayek’s Challenge to Habermas)
Cass R. Sunstein*
Abstract
For multiple reasons, deliberating groups often converge on falsehood rather than truth.
Individual errors may be amplified rather than cured. Group members may fall victim to a bad
cascade, either informational or reputational. Deliberators may emphasize shared information at
the expense of uniquely held information. Finally, group polarization may lead even rational
people to unjustified extremism. By contrast, prediction markets often produce accurate results,
because they create strong incentives for revelation of privately held knowledge and succeed in
aggregating widely dispersed information. The success of prediction markets offers a set of
lessons for increasing the likelihood that groups can obtain the information that their members
have.

Many institutions, both public and private, make their decisions through
deliberation. But why, exactly, is deliberation important or even desirable? A central
answer must be that deliberation will result in wiser judgments and better outcomes. But
does deliberation actually have this effect? The answer is by no means clear. Group
members may impose pressures on one another, leading to a consensus on falsehood
rather than truth. A group of like-minded people, with similar predilections, is
particularly vulnerable to this problem. The idea of “groupthink,” coined and elaborated
by Irving Janis, suggests the possibility that groups will tend toward uniformity and
censorship, thus failing to combine information and enlarge the range of arguments.1
Without structural protections, both private and public groups are likely to err, not in
spite of deliberation but because of it.
My aim here is to compare deliberation with an intriguing social innovation—
prediction markets—and to explore the advantages of the latter over the former in
aggregating information. One of my goals is to see how the successes of prediction
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markets might inform the practice of deliberation. To explain why deliberation often
fails, I investigate two sets of influences on members of deliberating groups.2 The first
consists of informational influences, by which group members fail to disclose what they
know out of deference to the information publicly announced by others. The second
involves social pressures, which lead people to silence themselves in order not to face
reputational sanctions, such as the disapproval of relevant others. As a result of these
problems, groups often amplify rather than correct individual errors; emphasize shared
information at the expense of unshared information; fall victim to cascade effects; and
tend to end up in more extreme positions in line with the predeliberation tendencies of
their members. In the United States, even federal judges are vulnerable to the relevant
pressures, as both Republican and Democratic appointees show especially ideological
voting when they are sitting with other judges appointed by presidents of the same
political party.3
Because of these pressures, deliberative processes often fail to achieve their
minimal goal of aggregating the information actually held by the deliberators. Indeed,
such processes often fail to aggregate information even as they decrease variance, and
increase confidence, among their members. A confident, cohesive, error-prone group is
nothing to celebrate. On the contrary, it might be extremely dangerous, both to itself and
to others.4
As we shall see, prediction markets often outperform deliberating groups, simply
because they are so effective at pooling dispersed information among diverse people.
Indeed, prediction markets realign private incentives in a way that makes them
exceptionally well-designed to reduce the problems that infect deliberating groups. Such
markets are worth investigating, in part because they provide an illuminating route by
which to explore some characteristic defects in deliberative processes––and by which to
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obtain insights about how they might work better. In addition, such markets are worth
investigating in their own right, if only because they promise to provide a supplement to
deliberation that might well improve social decisions.
Deliberating Groups
If deliberating groups do well, we can imagine three principal reasons:
• Groups are equivalent to their best members. One or more group members
will often know the right answer, and other members might well become
convinced of this fact. For this reason, groups might perform toward or at the
level of their best members. If some or many members suffer from ignorance
or from a form of bias that leads to error, others might correct them.
Deliberation might correct individual errors rather than propagate them, in a
way that allows convergence on the judgment of the most accurate group
member.
• The whole is the sum of the parts: aggregating information. Deliberation
could aggregate existing information in a way that leads the group as a whole
to know more than any individual member does. Suppose that the group
contains no experts on the question at issue, but that relevant information is
dispersed among members so that the group is potentially expert even if its
members are not. Or suppose that the group contains a number of experts, but
that each member is puzzled about how to solve a particular problem.
Deliberation might elicit the relevant information and allow the group to make
a sensible judgment. In this process, the whole is equal to the sum of the
parts—and the sum of the parts is what is sought.
• Improving on majority rule. Suppose that in advance of deliberation, each
group member is more than 50 percent likely to be right. The Condorcet Jury
Theorem shows that the likelihood that the group’s majority will be right
expands to 100 percent as the size of the group increases. Perhaps deliberating
groups will do better than would the majority of their individual members
without deliberation—whatever the initial distribution of correct answers
within those groups.
• The whole goes beyond the sum of the parts: synergy. The give and take of
group discussion might sift information and perspectives in a way that leads
the group to a good solution to a problem, one in which the whole is actually
more than the sum of its parts. In such cases, deliberation is, at the very least,
an ambitious form of information aggregation, one in which the exchange of
views leads to a creative answer or solution.
To what extent do these mechanisms work in practice? Two points are entirely
clear. First, deliberation usually reduces variance.5 After talking together, group members
5
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tend to come into accord with one another.6 Second, group members tend to become far
more confident of their judgments after they speak with one another.7 A significant effect
of group interactions is a greater sense that one’s postdeliberation conclusion is correct—
whether it actually is or not. Corroboration by others increases confidence in one’s
judgments.8 It follows that members of deliberating groups will usually converge on a
position on which members have a great deal of confidence. This is not disturbing if that
position is also likely to be correct—but if it is not, then many group members will end
up sharing a view in which they firmly believe, but which turns out to be wrong (a most
unfortunate and sometimes quite dangerous situation).
Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence that deliberating groups will
usually succeed in aggregating the information held by their members. With respect to
questions with definite answers, deliberating groups tend to do about as well as or
slightly better than their average members, but not as well as their best members.9 Hence,
it is false to say that group members usually end up deferring to their internal specialists.
Truth does not win out; the most that can be said is that under some conditions, the group
will converge on the truth if the truth begins with “at least some initial support” within
the group when the task has “a demonstrably correct answer.”10 Note here that when a
group outperforms most of its individual members, it is generally because the issue is one
on which a particular answer can be shown, to the satisfaction of all or most, to be right;
and that even in that condition, the group might not do well if the demonstrably correct
solution lacks significant support at the outset.
In general, simple majority schemes do fairly well at predicting group judgments
for many decision tasks. It follows that if the majority is wrong, the group will be wrong
6
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as well.11 With experts, the same general conclusion holds. Thus a “structured approach
for combining independent forecasts is invariably more accurate” than “traditional group
meetings,” which do “not use information efficiently.”12
Sources of Deliberative Failure
For two reasons, exposure to the views of others might lead people to silence
themselves. The first involves the informational signals provided by the acts and views of
other people. If most group members believe that X is true, there is reason to believe that
X is in fact true, and that reason might outweigh the purely private reason a particular
group member has to believe that X is false. If other group members share a particular
belief, isolated or minority members might not speak out, deferring to the informational
signal given by the statements of others. Not surprisingly, the strength of the signal will
depend on the number and nature of the people who are giving it. People are particularly
averse to being sole dissenters.13 If all but one person in a deliberating group has said that
X is true, then the remaining member is likely to agree X is true, even to the point of
ignoring the evidence of his own senses. And if the group contains one or more people
who are well-known to be authorities, then other group members are likely to defer to
them.
The second reason that group members might silence themselves involves social
influences. Their silence might stem not from a belief that they are wrong, as in the case
of informational pressure, but instead from the risk of social sanctions of various sorts. In
the most extreme cases, those sanctions will take the form of criminal punishment or
complete exclusion from the group. In less severe cases, those who defy the dominant
position within the group will incur a form of disapproval that will lead them to be less
trusted, liked, and respected in the future. Here, too, people are inevitably affected by the
number and nature of those with the majority position. A large majority will impose more
social pressure than a small one. If certain group members are leaders or authorities
willing and able to impose social sanctions of various sorts, others will be unlikely to
11
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defy them publicly.
Participation in deliberative processes, and the effects of informational and social
influences, can be put into a more general framework. Suppose that group members are
deliberating about some factual question; suppose, too, that each member has some
information that bears on the answer to that question. Will members disclose what they
know?
For each person, the answer may well depend on the individual benefits and the
individual costs of disclosure. In many situations, and entirely apart from informational
and social influences, the individual benefits of disclosure will be far less than the social
benefits. In this sense, participants in deliberation often face a collective action problem,
in which each person, following his rational self-interest, will tell the group less than it
needs to know. At least, this is so if each member receives only a small portion of the
benefits that come to the group from a good outcome—a plausible view about the
situation facing many institutions, including, for example, labor unions, religious
organizations, student and faculty groups, corporate boards, and government agencies
If the statements of others suggest that privately held information is wrong or
unhelpful, then the private benefit of disclosure is reduced much more. In that event, the
group member has reason to believe that disclosure will not improve the group’s decision
at all. Things are even worse if those who speak against the apparent consensus suffer
reputational injury (or more). In that event, the private calculus is straightforward:
Silence is golden.
Both informational pressure and social influences help explain the finding that in
a deliberating group, those in a minority position often silence themselves or otherwise
have disproportionately little weight. There is a more particular finding: Members of lowstatus groups—less-educated people, African-Americans, sometimes women—speak less
and carry less influence within deliberating groups than their higher-status peers.14 Both
informational influence and social pressures, likely to be especially strong for low-status
members, contribute to this result. The unfortunate consequence can be a loss of
information to the group as a whole, in a way that ensures that deliberating groups do far
14
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less well than they would if only they could aggregate the information held by group
members.
More generally, a comprehensive study has demonstrated that majority pressures
can be powerful even for factual questions to which some people know the right
answers.15 The study involved twelve hundred people, forming groups of six, five, and
four members. Individuals were asked true-false questions involving art, poetry, public
opinion, geography, economics, and politics. They were then asked to assemble into
groups, which discussed the questions and produced answers. The majority played a
substantial role in determining each group’s answers. The truth played a role, too, but a
lesser one. If a majority of individuals in the group gave the right answer, the group’s
decision moved toward the majority in 79 percent of the cases. If a majority of
individuals in the group gave the wrong answer, the group’s decision nonetheless moved
toward the majority in 56 percent of the cases. Hence, the truth did have an influence—
79 percent is higher than 56 percent—but the majority’s judgment was the dominant one.
And because the majority was influential even when wrong, the average group decision
was right only slightly more often than the average individual decision (66 percent versus
62 percent). What is most important is that groups did not perform as well as they would
have if they had properly aggregated the information that group members had.
Habermas vs. Hayek
Do these points amount to a challenge to deliberation as an ideal, or to deliberative
conceptions of democracy? Many of those interested in deliberation have attempted to
specify its preconditions in a way that is intended to ensure against predictable problems
that infect real-world processes. Jürgen Habermas, for example, stresses norms and
practices designed to allow victory by “the better argument”:
Rational discourse is supposed to be public and inclusive, to grant equal
communication rights for participants, to require sincerity and to diffuse any kind
of force other than the forceless force of the better argument. This
communicative structure is expected to create a deliberative space for the
16
mobilization of the best available contributions for the most relevant topics.
15

Robert L. Thorndike, “The Effect of Discussion upon the Correctness of Group Decisions: When the
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16
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In Habermas’s “ideal speech situation,” all participants attempt to seek the truth;
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they do not behave strategically or attempt to decide; they accept a norm of equality.

Other advocates of deliberative democracy have spoken similarly about what appropriate
18

deliberation entails. On this view, deliberation, properly understood, does not simply
involve the exchange of words and opinions. It imposes its own requirements and
preconditions. Indeed, deliberation has its own internal morality, one that operates as a
corrective to some of the effects of deliberative processes in the real world.
Unfortunately, preconditions of the sort identified by Habermas will cure few of the
problems that I shall be outlining here. Those preconditions will do little to affect the key
failures on the part of deliberating groups. Each of the failures is likely to arise even if
discourse is public and inclusive, even if participants are sincere, and even if everyone
has equal communication rights. We might therefore take the argument here as a
Hayekian challenge to Habermas—a challenge that stresses (with Friedrich Hayek) the
diffusion of information in society and the difficulty of aggregating that information
19

through deliberation (as opposed to the price signal, which Hayek championed).
Consider four sets of deliberative failures.
Deliberative Failure 1: Amplification of Cognitive Errors

It is well known that individuals do not always process information well. They
use heuristics that lead them to predictable errors; they are also subject to identifiable
biases, which also produce errors.20 For example, most people follow the
representativeness heuristic, in accordance with which judgments of probability are
influenced by assessments of resemblance (the extent to which A “looks like” B).21 The
representativeness heuristic helps explain what Paul Rozin and Carol Nemeroff have
17
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called “sympathetic magical thinking,” including the beliefs that some objects have
contagious properties, and that causes resemble their effects.22 The representativeness
heuristic often works well, but it can also lead to severe blunders.
People often err because they use the availability heuristic to answer difficult
questions about probability. When people use the availability heuristic, they answer a
question of probability by asking whether examples come readily to mind.23 Consider, for
example, the question whether we should fear a hurricane, a nuclear power accident, or a
terrorist attack. If it is easy to think of a case in which one of these hazards created
serious harm, the assessment of probability will be greatly affected. Of course, use of the
availability heuristic is not irrational, but it, too, can produce both excessive and
insufficient fear.
For purposes of assessing deliberation, a central question is whether groups avoid
the errors of the individuals who comprise them. There is no clear evidence that they do,
and often they do not—a vivid illustration of the principle, “garbage in, garbage out,” in a
way that mocks the aspiration to collective correction of individual blunders. In fact,
individual errors are not merely replicated but actually amplified in group decisions—a
process of “some garbage in, much garbage out.”
Consider some key findings. If individual jurors are biased because of
pretrial publicity that misleadingly implicates the defendant, or even because of the
defendant’s unappealing physical appearance, juries are likely to amplify rather than
correct those biases.24 Groups have been found to amplify, rather than to attenuate,
reliance on the representativeness heuristic;25 to reflect even larger framing effects than
individuals;26 to show more overconfidence than group members;27 to be more affected

22
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by the biasing effect of spurious arguments from lawyers;28 to be more susceptible to the
“sunk cost fallacy”;29 and to be more subject to choice-rank preference reversals.30 In an
especially revealing finding, groups have been found to make more, rather than fewer,
conjunction errors than individuals when individual error rates are high—though fewer
when individual error rates are low.31 In addition, groups demonstrate essentially the
same level of reliance on the availability heuristic, even when use of that heuristic leads
to clear errors.32
Deliberative Failure 2: Hidden Profiles and Common Knowledge
Suppose that group members have a great deal of information—enough to
produce the unambiguously right outcome if that information is properly aggregated.
Even if this is so, an obvious problem is that groups will not perform well if they
emphasize shared information and slight information that is held by one or a few
members. Unfortunately, countless studies demonstrate that this regrettable result is
highly likely.33 “Hidden profiles” is the term for accurate understandings that groups
could but do not obtain. Hidden profiles are, in turn, a product of the common-knowledge
effect, through which information held by all group members has more influence on
group judgments than information held by only a few members.34 The most obvious
explanation of the effect is the simple fact that as a statistical matter, common knowledge
is more likely to be communicated to the group; but social influences play a role as well.
Hidden Profiles. Consider a study of serious errors within working groups, both

28
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H. Davis, “Choice/Matching Preference Reversals in Groups,” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 64 (1995): 325.
31
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face-to-face and online.35 The purpose of the study was to see how groups might
collaborate to make personnel decisions. Resumes for three candidates applying for a
marketing manager position were placed before group members. The attributes of the
candidates were rigged by the experimenters so that one applicant was clearly the best for
the job described. Packets of information were given to subjects, each containing a subset
of information from the resumes, so that each group member had only part of the relevant
information. The groups consisted of three people, some operating face-to-face, some
operating online. Almost none of the deliberating groups made what was conspicuously
the right choice. The reason is simple: They failed to share information in a way that
would permit the group to make that choice. Members tended to share positive
information about the winning candidate and negative information about the losers. They
suppressed negative information about the winner and positive information about the
losers. Hence, their statements served to “reinforce the march toward group consensus
rather than add complications and fuel debate.”36
Or consider a simulation of political elections, in which information was parceled
out to individual members about three candidates for political office, and in which
properly pooled information could have led to what was clearly the best choice, candidate
A.37 In the first condition, each member of the four-person groups was given most of the
relevant information (66 percent of the information about each candidate). In that
condition, 67 percent of group members favored candidate A before discussion and 85
percent after discussion.38 This is a clear example of appropriate aggregation of
information. Groups significantly outperformed individuals, apparently because of the
exchange of information and reasons. Here, then, is a clear illustration of the possibility
that groups can aggregate what members know in a way that produces sensible outcomes.
In the second condition, by contrast, the information that favored candidate A was
parceled out to various members of the group so that only 33 percent of information
35

See Ross Hightower and Lutfus Sayeed, “The Impact of Computer-Mediated Communication
Systems on Biased Group Discussion,” Computers in Human Behavior 11 (1995): 33.
36
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82.
37
See Garold Stasser and William Titus, “Pooling of Unshared Information in Group Decision
Making: Biased Information Sampling during Discussion,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
48 (1985): 1467.
38
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about each candidate was shared. As the condition was designed, the shared information
favored two unambiguously inferior candidates, B and C; but if the unshared information
emerged through discussion, and were taken seriously, candidate A would be chosen. In
that condition, less than 25 percent of group members favored candidate A before
discussion, a natural product of the initial distribution of information. But (and this is the
key result) that number actually fell after discussion, simply because the shared
information had disproportionate influence on group members.39 In other words, groups
did worse, not better, than individuals when the key information was distributed
selectively. In those conditions, the commonly held information was far more influential
than the distributed information, to the detriment of the group’s ultimate decision.
From this and many similar studies, the general conclusion is that when “the
balance of unshared information opposes the initial most popular position . . . the
unshared information will tend to be omitted from discussion and, therefore, will have
little effect on members’ preferences during group discussion.”40 It follows that “group
decisions and postgroup preferences reflect the initial preferences of group members even
when the exchange of unshared information should have resulted in substantial shifts in
opinion.”41 Nor does discussion increase the recall of unshared information. On the
contrary, its major effect is to increase recall of the attributes of the initially most popular
candidate.42 The most disturbing conclusion is that when key information is unshared,
groups are “more likely to endorse an inferior option after discussion than [are] their
individual members before discussion.”43
The Common-Knowledge Effect. These results are best understood as a
consequence of the common-knowledge effect, by which information held by all group
members has far more influence on group judgments than information held by one
member or a few.44 More precisely, the “influence of a particular item of information is
directly and positively related to the number of group members who have knowledge of

39
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that item before the group discussion and judgment.”45 Under conditions of unshared
information, group judgments have been found to be “not any more accurate than the
average of the individual judgments, even though”—and this is the central point—the
groups were “in possession of more information than were any of the individuals.”46
As might be expected, the group’s focus on shared information increases with the
size of the group.47 In a study by Stasser and colleagues designed to test judgments about
candidates for office, involving both three-person and six-person groups, all discussions
focused far more on shared than on unshared information—but the effect was
significantly greater for six-person groups. Most remarkably, the researchers write, “it
was almost as likely for a shared item to be mentioned twice as it was for an unshared
item to be mentioned at all.”48 And despite the failures of their deliberations, group
members were significantly more confident in their judgments after discussion.49
Deliberative Failure 3: Cascades
A cascade is a process by which people influence one another, so much so that
participants ignore their private knowledge and rely instead on the publicly stated
judgments of others. There are two kinds of cascades: informational and reputational. In
informational cascades, people silence themselves out of deference to the information
conveyed by others. In reputational cascades, they silence themselves so as to avoid the
opprobrium of others.
Informational Cascades. Hidden profiles are closely related to informational
cascades, which greatly impair group judgments. Cascades need not involve deliberation,
but deliberative processes often involve cascades. As in the case of hidden profiles, the
central point is that those involved in a cascade do not reveal what they know. As a
result, the group does not obtain important information.
To see how informational cascades work, imagine a deliberating group that is

45
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deciding whether to authorize some new venture.50 Let us also assume that the jurors are
announcing their views in sequence, in a temporal queue, and that each member knows
his place in that queue. Every member has some private information about what should
be done. But each also attends, reasonably enough, to the judgments of others. Mr.
Andrews is the first to speak. He suggests that the venture should be authorized. Ms.
Barnes now knows Andrews’s judgment; it is clear that she, too, should vote in favor of
the venture if she agrees independently with Andrews. But if her independent judgment is
otherwise, she would—if she trusts Andrews no more and no less than she trusts
herself—be indifferent about what to do and might simply flip a coin.
Now turn to a third juror, Mr. Carlton. Suppose that both Andrews and Barnes
have argued in favor of the venture but that Carlton’s own information, though
inconclusive, suggests that the venture is a terrible idea. In that event, Carlton might well
ignore what he knows and follow Andrews and Barnes. It is likely in these circumstances
that both Andrews and Barnes had reasons for their conclusion, and unless Carlton thinks
that his own information is better than theirs, he should follow their lead. If he does,
Carlton is in a cascade. Now suppose that Carlton is acting in response to what Andrews
and Barnes did, not on the basis of his own information, and that subsequent members
know what Andrews, Barnes, and Carlton did. On reasonable assumptions, they will do
exactly what Carlton did: favor the venture regardless of their private information (which,
we are supposing, is relevant but inconclusive). This will happen even if Andrews
initially blundered.51
If this is what is happening, there is a serious social problem: Those who are in
the cascade do not disclose the information that they privately hold. In the example just
given, decisions will not reflect the overall knowledge, or the aggregate knowledge, of
those in the group—even if the information held by individual members, if actually
revealed and aggregated, would produce a quite different result. The reason is that people
are following the lead of those who came before. Subsequent speakers might fail to rely
on, and fail to reveal, private information that actually exceeds the information
50
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collectively held by those who started the cascade.
Cascades often occur in the real world within deliberating groups or elsewhere;52
they are easy to create in the laboratory. The simplest experiment asked subjects to guess
whether the experiment was using urn A, which contained two red balls and one white, or
urn B, which contained two white balls and one red.53 Subjects could earn $2.00 for a
correct decision, and hence an economic incentive favored correct individual decisions (a
point to which I will return). In each period, the contents of the chosen urn were emptied
into a container. A randomly selected subject was asked to make one (and only one)
private draw of a ball in each round. The subject recorded the color of that draw on an
answer sheet and his own decision about which urn was involved. The subject did not
announce his draw to the group, but he did announce his own decision to everyone. Then
the urn was passed to the next subject for his own private draw, which again was not
disclosed, and his own decision about the urn, which again was disclosed. This process
continued until all subjects had made draws and decisions. At that time, the experimenter
announced the actual urn used. If the subject had picked the urn only on the basis of his
private information, he would have been right 66.7 percent of the time. The point of the
experiment was to see whether people will decide to ignore their own draw in the face of
conflicting announcements by predecessors—and to explore whether such decisions will
lead to cascades and errors.
In the experiment, cascades often developed and often produced errors. After a
number of individual judgments were revealed, people sometimes announced decisions
that were inconsistent with their private draws, but that fit with the majority of previous
announcements.54 More than 77 percent of “rounds” resulted in cascades, and 15 percent
of private announcements did not reveal a “private signal,” that is, the information
provided by people’s own draws. Consider cases in which one person’s draw (say, red)
contradicted the announcement of his predecessor (say, urn B). In such cases, the second
announcement nonetheless matched the first about 11 percent of the time—far less than a
52
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majority, but enough to ensure cascades. And when one person’s draw contradicted the
announcement of two or more predecessors, the second announcement was likely to
follow those who went before. Of note, the majority of decisions were rationally based on
the available information55—but erroneous cascades nonetheless developed. Table 4-1
shows an example of a cascade that produced an inaccurate outcome (the urn used was
B):56
Table 4-1. An Informational Cascade

Private Draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
A
A

3
a
A

4
b
A

5
b
A

6
b
A

Source: Willinger and Ziegelmeyet, “Are More Informed Agents,” 291.

What is noteworthy here, of course, is that the total amount of private information
—four whites and two reds—justified the correct judgment, which was in favor of urn B.
But the existence of two early signals, producing rational but incorrect judgments, led
everyone else to fall in line. “Initial misrepresentative signals start a chain of incorrect
decisions that is not broken by more representative signals received later.”57 This result
maps directly onto real-world decisions by deliberating groups, in which people fail to
disclose what they know, to the detriment of the group as a whole.
Reputational Cascades. In a reputational cascade, people think they know what
is right, or what is likely to be right, but they nonetheless go along with the crowd in
order to maintain the good opinion of others. Suppose Albert suggests that global
warming is a serious problem and that Barbara concurs with Albert, not because she
actually thinks that Albert is right, but because she does not wish to seem, to Albert,
ignorant or indifferent to environmental protection. If Albert and Barbara seem to agree
that global warming is a serious problem, Cynthia not only might not contradict them
publicly, but also might even appear to share their judgment, not because she believes
that judgment to be correct, but because she does not want to face their hostility or lose
55
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their good opinion.
It should be easy to see how this process might generate a cascade. Once Albert,
Barbara, and Cynthia offer a united front on the issue, their friend David might be most
reluctant to contradict them, even if he thinks they are wrong. In the actual world of
group decisions, people are, of course, uncertain whether publicly expressed statements
are a product of independent information, participation in an informational cascade, or
reputational pressure. Much of the time, listeners and observers undoubtedly overstate the
extent to which the actions of others are based on independent information.
The possibility of reputational cascades is demonstrated by an ingenious variation
on the urn experiment mentioned above.58 In this experiment, people were paid $0.25 for
a correct decision, but $0.75 for a decision that matched the decision of the majority of
the group. There were punishments for incorrect and nonconforming answers as well. If
people made an incorrect decision, they lost $0.25; if their decision failed to match the
group’s decision, they lost $0.75.
In this experiment, cascades appeared almost all of the time. No fewer than 96.7
percent of rounds resulted in cascades, and 35.3 percent of people’s announcements did
not match their private signal, that is, the signal given by their own draw. And when the
draw of a subsequent person contradicted the announcement of the predecessor, 72.2
percent of people matched the first announcement. Consider, as a dramatic illustration,
table 4-2, which shows this period of the experiment (the actual urn was B):59
Table 4-2. Conformity and Cascades

Private Draw
Decision

1
a
A

2
b
A

3
b
A

4
b
A

5
a
A

6
b
A

7
b
A

8
b
A

9
a
A

10
B
A

Source: Hung and Plott, “Information Cascades.”

This experiment shows that especially unfortunate results should be expected if
people are rewarded not only or not mostly for being correct, but also or mostly for doing
what other people do. The problem is that people are not revealing the information they
actually have.

58
59
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Deliberative Failure 4: Group Polarization
There are clear links among hidden profiles, social cascades, and the wellestablished phenomenon of group polarization, by which members of a deliberating
group end up adopting a more extreme version of the position toward which they tended
before deliberation began.60 The problem is especially severe for groups of like-minded
people, who typically end up in more extreme positions as a result of deliberation. Group
polarization is the typical pattern with deliberating groups, and it has been found in
hundreds of studies involving more than a dozen countries, including the United States,
France, Afghanistan, and Germany.61 For example, those who disapprove of the United
States and are suspicious of its intentions will increase their disapproval and suspicion if
they exchange points of view. Indeed, there is specific evidence of the latter phenomenon
among citizens of France.62
Group polarization occurs for matters of fact as well as issues of value, though it
is easier to demonstrate the latter. If the question is whether a terrorist attack will occur in
the United States in the next year, group polarization will not be easy to test, simply
because the answer is either yes or no, and it is not simple to demonstrate greater
extremism in binary choices. But suppose that people are asked, on a bounded scale of
zero to eight, how likely it is that a terrorist attack will occur in the United States in the
next year, with zero indicating “zero probability,” eight indicating “absolutely certain,”
seven indicating “overwhelmingly likely,” six “more probable than not,” and five “fiftyfifty.” In that event, the answers from a deliberating group will tend to reveal group
polarization, as people move toward more extreme points on the scale depending on their
initial median point. If the predeliberation median is five, the group judgment will usually
be six; if the predeliberation median is three, the group judgment will usually be two.63
Recall here that federal judges are highly susceptible to group polarization, as both
Democratic and Republican appointees show far more ideological voting patterns when
sitting with other judges appointed by a president of the same political party.64 Juries
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polarize as well.65
Why does group polarization occur? There are three reasons.66 The first and most
important involves the now-familiar idea of informational influence, but in a distinctive
form. People respond to the arguments made by other people—and the “argument pool”
in any group with some predisposition in one direction will inevitably be skewed toward
that predisposition. As a statistical matter, the arguments favoring the initial position will
be more numerous than those pointing in the other direction. Individuals will have heard
of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge from group deliberation. As a result of
the relevant arguments, deliberation will lead people toward a more extreme point in line
with what group members initially believed.
The second explanation involves social influences. People want to be perceived
favorably by other group members. Sometimes people’s publicly stated views are, to a
greater or lesser extent, a function of how they want to present themselves. Once they
hear what others believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction
of the dominant position in order to hold onto their preserved self-presentation. They shift
accordingly.67
The third explanation stresses that people with extreme views tend to have more
confidence that they are right, and that, as people gain confidence, they become more
extreme in their beliefs.68 In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s opinions
have been shown to become more extreme simply because their views have been
corroborated and because they have been more confident after learning of the shared
views of others.69
Note that if it is understood in these terms, group polarization may well reflect
rational behavior at the individual level.70 Suppose that each group member privately
assigns a significant probability, say of 0.6, to the truth of some hypothesis (say, that
65
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North Korea will have nuclear weapons within the next year). Suppose, further, that
group discussion leads each group member to hear evidence largely supportive of the
hypothesis, leading to a judgment in favor of a higher probability, say of 0.7. Rational
updating may be entirely responsible for the shift. Now suppose all group members report
after deliberation that they have each independently arrived at a probability of 0.7 for the
truth of the hypothesis, based on the evidence they have received (and starting with a
prior of 0.6). What this means is that there have been a total number of n independent
items of evidence in support of the hypothesis (one such item foreach of n group
members), each of which has been sufficiently strong to support a Bayesian update from
0.6 to 0.7. The existence of these n independent items of evidence should then lead the
group as a whole—and each group member post-deliberation—to assign a still higher
posterior probability to the hypothesis, i.e., a probability well above 0.7.
Whether rational updating of this kind will produce accurate or inaccurate
judgments depends on the antecedently held information within the group. Suppose that
for people who are fully informed, the probability that the relevant hypothesis is true is in
fact 0.3. If the group starts from a significantly inflated probability estimate, group
polarization will lead them to make severe errors. Nothing in the phenomenon of group
polarization demonstrates that deliberation will lead to blunders. But if the median
predeliberation view is wrong, groups are likely to do worse than their individual
members.
It should be clear that the four sources of deliberative failure can create serious
problems for deliberating groups. What might be done in response? I have mentioned
Hayek’s suggestion that the price mechanism is an excellent way to aggregate dispersed
information. Might the price system be enlisted as a supplement to, or even a replacement
for, social deliberation?
Prediction Markets
Deliberation is one way to aggregate privately held information, but there are
many other possibilities. An obvious alternative is to rely on the price signal, which has a
similar aggregative function. As Hayek emphasized, the price mechanism is a kind of
“marvel,” because it combines widely dispersed information held by diverse people. And
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if an emphasis is placed on the information-aggregating properties of markets, it would
seem plain that, to improve on the answer produced by deliberating groups, we might
consider an increasingly popular possibility: Create a market.71 Prediction markets, a
recent innovation, have proved remarkably successful at forecasting future events; they
seem to do far better, in many domains, than deliberating groups. Such markets are worth
sustained attention, in part because they offer important lessons about how to make
deliberation go better or worse, and in part because they provide a useful model for many
private and public organizations.
Potential and Promise. A central advantage of prediction markets is that they
impose the right incentives for diverse people to disclose the information they separately
hold. Recall that in a deliberating group, members often have little incentive to say what
they know. By speaking out, they provide benefits to others while possibly facing high
private costs. Prediction markets realign incentives in a way that is precisely designed to
overcome these problems. Because investments in such markets are generally not
disclosed to the public, investors need not fear reputational sanctions if, for example, they
have predicted that a company’s sales will be low or that a certain candidate will be
elected president. And because people stand to gain or lose from their investments, they
have a strong incentive to use (and in that sense to disclose) whatever private information
they hold; they can capture, rather than give to others, the benefits of disclosure. The use
of private information will be reflected in the price signal. In these crucial ways, the
problems that infect deliberating groups are largely eliminated in prediction markets.
Prediction markets also impose strong incentives for traders to ferret out accurate
information. Traders do not trade blindly, and they are entirely able to stop trading, for a
moment or more, in order to retrieve better information that will give them an advantage.
In many deliberating groups, by contrast, participants cannot leave; they must continue
deliberating, and the necessary information is, at best, dispersed and locked within
individual participants. Well-functioning systems of deliberation encourage group
members to act dynamically to acquire further information, just as markets do.
71
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Of course, investors, like everyone else, are subject to the informational pressure
imposed by the views of others. But a market creates strong incentives for revelation of
whatever information people actually hold. And indeed, prediction markets have been
found not to amplify individual errors but to eliminate them; the prices that result from
trading prove reliable even if many individual traders err. In recent years, prediction
markets have done more than to provide valuable information. In countless domains, their
forecasts have proved extremely accurate.72 The most dramatic finding is that prices
generally operate as probabilities. When prices suggest that events are likely to occur
with 90 percent probability, they occur 90 percent of the time; when the price suggest a
probability of 80 percent, the events happen 80 percent of the time; and so forth.
Since 1988, the University of Iowa has run the Iowa Electronic Markets (IEM),
which allow people to bet on the outcome of presidential elections. Before the 2004
elections, they did far better than professional polling organizations, outperforming polls
451 out of 596 times.73 In the week before the four elections from 1988 to 2000, the
predictions in the Iowa market showed an average absolute error of just 1.5 percentage
points—a significant improvement over the 2.1 percentage point error in the final Gallup
polls. In 2004, the Iowa market did even better. On midnight of November 1, it showed
Bush with 50.45% of the vote and Kerry with 49.55%—very close to the final numbers
of 51.56% for Bush and 48.44% for Kerry.
Prediction markets, aggregating diverse views, are flourishing in numerous
domains. Consider the Hollywood Stock Exchange, in which people predict (among other
things) Oscar nominees and winners as well as opening weekend box office figures. The
level of accuracy has been extremely impressive, especially in view of the fact that the
traders use virtual rather than real money. Among the most impressive achievements of
the Hollywoos Stock exchange to date is its uncanny accuracy in predicting Oscar
winners, with correct judgments in fifteen of the sixteen the categories for which trading

72

For early overviews, see David M. Pennock et al., The Real Power of Artificial Markets, 291
Science 987 (2001); David M. Pennock et al., The Power of Play: Efficiency and Forecast Accuracy in
Web Market Games, NEC Research Institute Technical Report 1000-168 (2001). A wealth of valuable
information can be found at http://www.chrisfmasse.com/
73
See Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Harnessing the Power of Information: A New Approach to
Economic Development 4 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. For Regulatory Studies, Working Paper No. 04-21,
2004), available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=846.

22

was allowed in the last two years. The markets for the demand for gas outperform the
experts on the demand for gas.74 Many people believe that “you can’t predict the
weather,” but the National Weather Service does quite well, and Orange Juice futures do
75

even better. A large prediction market focuses on the likelihood that economic data
76

released later in the week will show specific values; the market has performed even
better than the consensus forecasts of a survey of about fifty professional forecasters.
Many companies are now using prediction markets to aggregate diverse views.
Hewlett Packard (HP) and the California Institute of Technology initiated a project to
study prediction markets as an information aggregation mechanism involving product
77

sales.

In no fewer than six of the eight markets for which official forecasts were

available, the market prediction was significantly closer to the actual outcome than the
official forecast. For its part, Google has created a large set of prediction markets to help
to forecast its own development.78 The relevant markets predict launch dates for products,
new office openings, and a range of other outcomes of importance to the company. The
outcomes have been exceedingly accurate; prices have actually represented probabilities.
Dispersed knowledge within the company has been accurately aggregated in this way.
Many other companies, including Ely Lilly and Microsoft, have used prediction markets
as well to supplement deliberation about future courses of action.
To be sure, prediction markets themselves involve a measure of deliberation.
Many individual investors are likely to have deliberated with others before they invest. In
some such markets, investors undoubtedly act as “teams,” pooling resources after
deliberating together about what to do. The point is that decisions ultimately come not
from asking group members to come up with a mutually agreeable conclusion, but by
reference to the price signal, which will have aggregated a great deal of diverse
information. It is for this reason that prediction markets outperform deliberative
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processes.
Strategy, Manipulation, and Limitations. It is natural to wonder about whether
and when prediction markets might fail. Some clues are provided by two conspicuous
failures. Such markets found it more probable than not that Special Prosecutor Patrick
Fitzgerald would indict White House adviser Karl Rove in 2005, and they found it
exceedingly improbable that President George W. Bush would appoint John Roberts to
the United States Supreme Court. The best explanation is that there was not a great deal
of dispersed information about the particular decisions of Special Prosecutor Fitzgerald
or President Bush. To be sure, investors knew that Fitzgerald would not indict Bush
himself and that President Bush would not appoint Fitzgerald (or Tony Blair, Saddam
Hussein, or John Kerry) to the Supreme Court; but they lacked the kind of information
that would permit successful judgments about the probability that a particular movie
would win the Oscars, or that a particular product would do well in the market, or that a
particular candidate would be elected in a contested race.
There is an additional problem. Suppose that investors know that their “bets”
might have a significant impact on the hypothesis that the market is supposed to predict.
Investors might believe, for example, that the predictions of the Iowa Electronic Markets
will affect the outcomes of political campaigns, by making certain candidates look
promising or instead doomed. Such investors might pour immense sums of money into
bets on their preferred candidates, and in the process hope to create a self-fulfilling
prophecy. This danger seems nonexistent for genuinely exogenous events, such as a
natural disaster or an unusual weather pattern. But for economic events, political
campaigns, product success, and terrorism, the risk of manipulation cannot be ruled out
of bounds.
Existing evidence does suggest that the risk may be more hypothetical than real.
Several efforts to manipulate election markets have been made, and they have not
succeeded: In a short time, canny investors see that prices are inflated or deflated, and the
price rapidly returns to normal. More experience is required to know whether
manipulation will work in other contexts.
Feasibility, Markets, and Deliberation Once More. I have suggested that
prediction markets face a pervasive problem of feasibility. A deliberating jury, for
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example, could not enlist such markets to decide on questions of guilt or innocence.
Among other things, there is no objective way to test whether the jury, or individual
jurors, ended up with the right answer (and if there were, the jury might well be
dispensable). More generally, it is not easy to see how prediction markets could be used
on normative questions. At most, such markets could be used on the factual questions that
are sometimes part of such questions.
There is another problem. When the relevant groups are small, effective markets
may be impossible to create, simply because of the absence of sufficient numbers of
investors. A certain number is necessary to ensure that prediction markets have enough
information to aggregate. Nonetheless, government agencies might well enlist such
markets to resolve a number of questions, and ambitious efforts are underway to examine
how government might enlist them to answer an array of disputed questions.79
In fact governments might use prediction markets to help make projections about
insolvency, budget deficits, and the costs and benefits of proposed regulations.80 In each
of these cases, the predictions of prediction markets might provide a “reality check” for
deliberative processes. Officials might take into account the markets’ predictions of the
anticipated damage from a natural disaster, the number of annual deaths from an actual or
anticipated disease (such as mad cow disease or AIDS), the number of American
casualties from a war effort, the existence of demonstrable harms from global warming
by, say, 2010, the likelihood of scarcity of natural resources, shrinkage of tropical forests
in the world, demonstrable deterrent effects from capital punishment or other severe
punishments, increases or decreases in emissions of specified air pollutants, increases or
decreases in concentrations of air pollution in the ambient air, and much more. In all
these cases, private or public institutions might create markets to provide information on
crucial questions, and public institutions might take that information into account in
making judgments about policy.
The broadest point is that, even when prediction markets are not feasible, an
understanding of their virtues helps illuminate the virtues and vices of deliberation—and
helps show how to obtain more of the former and less of the latter. Such markets
79
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overcome the collective action problem from which deliberating groups suffer; they also
give people a strong incentive to say what they know and to back their best-grounded
convictions with money. It should be possible for deliberating groups to learn from the
successes of markets, above all by encouraging their members to disclose their privately
held information. When such groups do poorly, it is often because they fail to elicit the
information that their members have. Good norms, and good incentives, can go a long
way toward reducing this problem. Consider here a fundamental redefinition of what it
means to be a “team player.” Frequently a team player is thought to be someone who
does not upset the group’s consensus. But it would be possible, and a great deal better, to
understand team players as those who increase the likelihood that the team will be right—
if necessary, by disrupting the conventional wisdom.
The point applies to many organizations, including corporate boards. In the
United States, the highest-performing companies tend to have “extremely contentious
boards that regard dissent as an obligation” and that “have a good fight now and then.”81
Investment clubs have little dissent, and lose a great deal of money, when members are
united by close social ties.82 By contrast, the best-performing investment clubs lack such
ties and benefit from dissent and epistemic diversity. When deliberating groups do badly,
fear of social sanctions is often a major reason. When they do well, they resemble
prediction markets in the sense that their members have a strong incentive to disclose
their private information.
Conclusion
Groups often hold a great deal of information, and an important task is to elicit and use
the information of their members. Deliberation is generally thought to be the best way of
carrying out that task, but deliberative bodies are subject to serious problems. Much of
the time, informational influences and social pressures lead members not to say what they
know. As a consequence, groups tend to propagate and even amplify cognitive errors.
They also emphasize shared information at the expense of unshared information,
resulting in hidden profiles. Cascade effects and group polarization are common.
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Prediction markets have significant advantages over deliberative processes, and in
many contexts they might supplement or even replace those processes. Such markets tend
to correct rather than amplify individual errors, above all because they allow shrewd
investors to take advantage of the mistakes made by others. By providing economic
rewards for correct individual answers, they encourage investors to disclose the
information they have. As a result, they are often more accurate than the judgments of
deliberating groups. To the extent feasible, many groups would often do well to enlist
prediction markets in arriving at their judgments, above all because of the accuracy of the
price signal. Much more broadly, deliberating groups might attempt to counteract the
pressures I have explored, learning from the successes of prediction markets to reduce the
risks of deliberative failure.
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